Japan’s Interchange Association Chairman Mitsuo Ohashi, left, and Taiwan’s Association of East Asian Relations Chairman Liao Liou-yi (AP Photo/Wally Santana)

There is a lot of buzz about U.S. rebalancing policy, but at the end of the day it is not a massive policy change from the U.S. perspective and neither is it one from the perspective of U.S. allies and partners, old and emerging ones, in the region. The increase of a U.S. military presence has been rather symbolic so far (e.g. deployment of U.S. Marines in Australia or new radar and reconnaissance drones in Japan). The U.S. interest in developing closer economic ties and removing existing barriers is not that new either. Negotiations (at times quite controversial) between the U.S. on the one side and Japan, Korea, or Taiwan on the other, regarding removal of trade barriers have been going for years and all these economies plus China are already major trade partners to the U.S. The relatively new element of the U.S. economic engagement is the intent to use the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), formerly an organization consisting of rather small economies from both sides of Asia-Pacific, as a vehicle for moving towards a massive free trade zone.

What is new in this respect is the changed dynamic that came along with China’s rise as economic and military power holder. U.S. rebalancing is to a large extent a reaction to this development as well as the acknowledgment of the increasing prominence of the whole region. However, in terms of capabilities it stands on long-present U.S. security and economic commitments in the region. Thus, rebalancing is about strengthening existing and developing emerging alliances and partnerships and as such it is to a large degree a reaction to demands of regional stakeholders who are worried about recent Beijing’s posturing in South and East China Seas.

The case of the complex web of relations among the U.S., Japan and Taiwan is a good example of the flexible approach of the U.S. rebalancing policy, combining official defence ties with Japan, unofficial partnership with Taiwan, and the convergence of interests in Taiwan-Japan relations. If we were looking for arguments as to why the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan triangle is a relationship to follow closely, the 3^rd Taiwan-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue forum (hereafter trilateral forum or forum), held in Taipei on 15 October, provided more than a handful of ideas. The event was organised by the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, the Tokyo Foundation and Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At this forum, the Taiwan side, as organizer, expressed interest in furthering the relationship between Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan. One of the broader issues discussed during forum was the TPP, and the U.S. and Japan’s interest in Taiwan’s participation. Kurt Campbell, an architect of US President Barack Obama’s rebalancing policy and strong supporter of enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan, stressed that Taiwan should have political ambition in diversifying its economy and join the TPP, bringing up Vietnam as a country that took the steps to liberalise its economy in just a year and a half. Campbell’s comment is in line with the stance of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who expressed his support for Taiwan’s entry into the TPP during his meeting with Taiwan’s former Vice President Vincent Siew on the sidelines of the APEC economic leaders’ summit in the early October.

Naturally, controversial issues were not absent when Taiwan’s representative Timothy Yang reiterated that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands are (ROC) Chinese territory during the forum, claiming that the disputed islands are an “inherent part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of China”. However, this statement should not be taken at face value. While both sides of Taiwan’s political arena insist that the islands belong to Taiwan (for different reasons), the real issue is not about actual sovereignty as much as it is about the exercise of fishing rights. In this respect, Tokyo and Taipei reached a fisheries agreement last April in in an extraordinary exercise of pragmatism on both sides. Current Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s role in reaching out to Taiwan and concluding long-stalled talks was instrumental. Yang’s statement is thus mere lip service to Taipei’s claim and does not represent major problem in developing bilateral cooperation. After all, Yang was pretty clear when he expressed that the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement “serves as a good example of the spirit of the initiative, with Taipei and Tokyo entertaining the possibility of expanding the pact to other areas of mutual concern”. According to Yoshiyuki Ogasawara, an expert on Taiwanese politics at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, the fishing agreement is not merely a fishing pact but a first step towards stabilizing the East China Sea. In this sense, the agreement is fully in line with U.S. efforts and Taipei and Tokyo demonstrated that both sides can make a direct contribution to regional stability. This has not been unnoticed by the U.S. participants at the trilateral forum. Dan Burton, a former member of the US House of Representatives, praised Taiwan for trying to resolve the fishing rights issues with Japan “in a very responsible way” despite the ongoing territorial tensions over the islands.

The proverbial elephant in the room is Taiwan’s extensive economic interdependence with China. Beijing is Taiwan’s largest trading partner and its bilateral trade has expanded more than tenfold since 2000 and intensified further after the enactment of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a quasi-FTA. During his meeting with participants from the trilateral forum, President Ma admitted that maintaining good relations with the U.S., Japan and China at the same time “has been the biggest challenge”. Randy Schriver, Former Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs under the Bush Administration, also acknowledged that Taiwan may be in a difficult position with “its most important economic partner, China, and its most important security partner, the U.S.–Japan alliance” at times when support for eventual independence in Taiwan is increasing. Praise for the improvement of cross-Strait relations is the standard mantra for addressing efforts of Ma’s policy towards the PRC and it was not different during the forum when the “Cross-strait rapprochement” was applauded by Kurt Campbell. However, the current state of affairs between Taiwan and China should not be taken for granted. Ma Ying-jeou could not proceed with elevating economic dialogue with Beijing to political level because of the extreme sensitivity of the issue and massive preference among Taiwan’s population for the status quo. As Xi Jinping’s recent remarks indicate, China’s patience with Taiwan’s stalling on the political talks issue may be over rather sooner than later. Since no leader in Taipei will have a mandate to pursue political talks (which equal talks about re-unification in the PRC’s thinking), Taiwan would be better off to reach out to the U.S. and Japan. The trilateral forum that is co-organized by Taiwan’s foreign ministry is a demonstration of the increasing awareness thereof.

In the case of U.S.-Japan-Taiwan ties, it is converging interests, apart from official ties demonstrated by the U.S.-Japan defence treaty of 1960, which represent strong foundations for the development of trilateral partnership. Irrespective of Japan’s policy on ‘One China’, Taiwan under the control of the PRC would be a security nightmare for Tokyo, particularly when tensions between Japan and China are high due to Beijing’s pressure over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/Senkakus and the East China Sea in general. In a stark contrast to relations between China and Japan (and Korea and Japan), relations between Japan and Taiwan are generally in very good shape, enabled by extraordinary people-to-people relations. Taiwan’s citizens’ individual donations made Taiwan the top donor to Japan after the 3/11 earthquake and tsunami in 2011. This has been returned on many occasions by Japanese citizens’ expressions of sympathy through donations or support during sports events.

The development and strengthening of Japan-Taiwan relations is beneficial to the U.S.’ rebalancing efforts as one element is increasing capabilities of the regional partners, so they would not have to rely solely on the presence of U.S. forces. The U.S.-Japan link in the trilateral partnership is easier to examine because of the existence of formal diplomatic relations and a bilateral defence treaty. Japan-Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan relations benefit and at the same time suffer from the intentional (strategic) ambiguity that is a necessary component due to the peculiar political status of Taiwan. It benefits because it enables a certain degree of creativity in the absence of formal agreements, it suffers because of the lack of demonstration of the partnership to third parties, namely the PRC. Thus, one shall not expect much clarity in the trilateral dialogue but that does not mean there is not great room for cooperation and convergence of strategic interests.

This article was originally written for China Policy Institute.

*Misato Matsuoka is a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. Research interests cover the U.S.-Japan alliance, neo-Gramscianism and regionalism in Asia-Pacific.

ROK Destroyer tests ship-based Hyunmoo-3c this past winter (Via AFP/South Korean Defense Ministry)

The Republic of Korea (ROK) will test the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) current charm offensive on October 1st when the ROK  holds a military parade in Seoul to mark the 65th anniversary of the founding of their armed forces. Around 11,000 ROK troops and various military vehicles will roll through Seoul during the event (past versions looking vaguely like a DPRK military parade), but the biggest draw of the performance will be a public showing of the domestically-designed Hyunmoo-3c (Hyeonmu, 현무) cruise missile.

The Hyunmoo-3c carries a 500 kg conventional warhead and  possesses a range of 1,500 km. It is designed specifically for countering DPRK threats beyond the front lines of the DMZ, including DPRK ballistic missile launching capabilities and nuclear sites  (though Beijing also falls within the 1,500 km rage). Its public showing, and the celebration itself, with be a litmus test of relations between the North and South.

Recent weeks have seen a thawing of ROK and DPRK relations, as the two sides reestablished their military hotline, agreed to reopen the cooperatively-run Kaesong Industrial Complex, and potential renewed family reunions at the DPRK’s Diamond Mountain resort. The DPRK has sought reverse diplomatic damage done during a complete shutdown of Kaesong and a severing of relations with the ROK earlier in the year. The DPRK’s Kaesong gambit won nothing for their nation diplomatically and its closing proved too economically damaging to persist.

However, the DPRK excels at bipolar diplomacy, cozy-ing up to enemies one month and threatening nuclear annihilation the next. The nation’s most recent tantrums fell on deaf ears, but their diplomacy continually changes tack between charm and diatribes. The October 1st ROK Armed Forces Parade and public Hyunmoo-3 showing will gauge how much leeway the DPRK is affording the ROK. Should little rhetoric emerge from the DPRK during the event,  it will be an  indicator of the DPRK’s Kaesong needs and their current desire to maintain cooperation.

From the ROK perspective, the Hyunmoo-3 parading through Seoul demonstrates President Geun-Hye’s strategy of engagement, cooperation, and trust-building, backed by strength of arms. The ROK has publicly indicated a toned-down event in attempts to preserve current DPRK/ROK relations, while at the same time deciding to parade the Hyunmoo-3c in potential response to images from late August showing the restart of the DPRK’s Yongbyon reactor. This is the ROK’s and President Park’s own version of bipolar diplomacy, something akin to speaking softy and carrying a big stick.

The ROK has occasionally allowed DPRK transgressions to slide in the overall scheme of progress between the two nations, and seems to be more apt to do so from it’s current position of strength. The DPRK rarely wastes such an opportunity to denounce its Southern kin, but warming relations sees the DPRK increasingly silent on “transgressions” that used to inspire vehement soapbox tirades. A silent DPRK during ROK military festivities this October would indicate that their current charm offensive will  likely continue into the near future, and will be a key indicator of just how much the DPRK wants a cooperative South Korea.

Will President Obama invite his Vietnamese counterpart, Truong Tan Sang, to sample a Big Mac American-style during his visit to the United States? This past week the mainstream media have been overwhelmed by news of the forthcoming McDonald’s opening in Ho Chi Minh City, formerly known as Saigon. This development should not have come as a surprise, especially since Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization in 2007, but it did provide an opportunity to renew a seasoned debate about the actual winner of the war between the U.S. and Vietnam. A war that ended on 30 April, 1975 with the entrance of North Vietnamese forces in the former Saigon and the frenzied flight of the last American citizens by helicopter from the rooftop of the embassy.

Much more interesting was the announcement of the official visit of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s President to Washington at the invitation of the U.S. President from July 24 – 26, especially if we consider that Sang’s visit is only the second by a Vietnamese head of state to Washington since 1995, after Nguyen Minh Triet’s visit in 2007. “The visit has come at a time when the two nations are diversifying their exchange channels in the drive for development,” the Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S., Nguyen Quoc Cuong, stated. These “channels” will presumably strengthen relationship between Washington and Hanoi in different fields, predominantly at the political and economic level.

Indeed it should not be forgotten that already at the beginning of June during the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual regional security forum held in Singapore, Vietnamese Prime Minster Nguyen Tan Dung announced that “it is our desire to establish strategic partnerships with all the permanent members of the UN Security Council…” As underlined recently in a research paper by Prof. Carlyle A. Thayer, a leading scholar on Vietnam at the Australia Defence Force Academy, “Vietnam already negotiated strategic partnerships with China, Russia and the United Kingdom. Now Vietnam was signaling that it was seeking to upgrade its relations with the United States and France.”

It will also be interesting to see how far the two parties are ready to go in improving relations in the field of defense and security. This is an issue that necessarily involves a debate on human rights, on which the U.S. government appears unwilling to compromise.In a few words, Hanoi wants to have the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) restrictions removed and Washington has been asking of its counterpart to improve its human rights record. At present, Vietnam is permitted to purchase non-lethal items on a case-by-case basis. “However, ITAR has been amended recently to permit the sale of dual use (military/civilian) equipment and technology,” Thayer writes, thus raising the possibility of defense-related sales to Vietnam.

Among other issues, “the President also looks forward to discussing human rights,” as underlined in a statement released July 11, 2013 by the White House. However, “human rights should be part [of a larger U.S.] strategy, but should not become the focal point that impedes progress in other areas,” argues Prof. Thayer.

In fact “the President welcomes this opportunity to discuss with President Sang how to further strengthen our partnership on regional strategic issues and enhance our cooperation with ASEAN […] and the importance of completing a high standard Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement,” the With House statement said.

In this context it is not a coincidence that Sang arrives in Washington one month after Vietnam’s defense chief, Senior Lieutenant General Do Ba Ty, visited the Pentagon for the first time since the end of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War 40 years ago. The chief of the general staff of the People’s Army of Vietnam met with U.S. Army General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs.

“Sang’s arrival will give both sides an opportunity to recalibrate the bilateral relationship,” writes Murray Hiebert, CSIS Senior Fellow and Deputy Director. The talks should tell us more also about the two countries respective relationships with China. Nowadays, both Vietnam and the U.S. are generally very careful not to upset the People’s Republic of China.

Sang meets Obama after the official talks in Beijing with Xi Jinping, who welcomed his Vietnamese counterpart just after returning from Washington. A network of relationships that has implications not only at a bilateral, but also at a regional level, where one of the major flashpoints is the dispute in the South China Sea, called the East Sea by the Vietnamese.

At the beginning of June, at the Shangri-La dialogue, the Vietnamese Prime Minister made an appeal for greater strategic trust. More specifically, Vietnam’s Prime Minister called for unity among Southeast Asian countries, especially in this historical moment when China is asserting its claims in the South China Sea. An appeal that has not fallen on deaf ears in the U.S., evidently seeking a further partner in Vietnam to support its ‘pivot’ in Asia Pacific. This is a strategic decision, seen with suspicion by Beijing, which fears a containment action by Washington. For its part, Hanoi cannot disengage from its relationship with China, which is bound by political and economic relations.

On the one hand, bilateral relations between the United States and Vietnam have improved dramatically since normalization in 1995. The two-way trade reached $25 billion in 2012 (with the United States suffering a trade deficit of almost $16 billion) and they are partners in the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) trade agreement negotiations. To go into effect, a TPP agreement (if one is reached) would require approval by both houses of Congress. On the other hand, Vietnam has a trade deficit with China of circa $16 billion. During Sang’s visit to China, Xi promised that it would “actively take effective and drastic measures” to reduce this deficit.

This economic picture clearly shows the Vietnamese dilemma. Hanoi wants to maintain its economic growth, but at the same time it needs to build new political and military relationships with superpowers like the U.S. in order to counterbalance the ‘rising China’.

Despite China and Vietnam having recently pledged to boost cooperation and taken actions like setting up naval hotlines to prevent conflicts, the threat of confrontation is more real than ever, especially because of the aggressive behaviour showed by Beijing.Hanoi wants to forge new and stronger relations with countries that might provide their support vis-à-vis China. It is in this perspective that one should look at Hanoi’s relationships with the U.S., Australia, India and the major players in ASEAN, like Indonesia. And one should also not forget that ASEAN is chaired by Vietnamese diplomat Le Luong Minh and that it remains the natural strategic field to lobby for Vietnam’s interest and to reinforce the call for a binding Code of Conduct among ASEAN and China on the South China Sea.

Roberto Tofani is a freelance journalist and analyst covering South East Asia. He is also the co-founder of PlanetNext, an association of journalists committed to the concept of “information for change” and editor of Sudestasiatico.com. 

In an article in The Diplomat, Robert Kelly raised an interesting question regarding whether the youth protests that have engulfed Turkey, Brazil, Egypt will spread to Asia. He argued that all of them have a common denominator with other Asian countries, where there are:

[W]ell-educated youth, exposed through modern technologies to the reality of better, cleaner governance elsewhere. And many of the problems these protests are identifying exist in spades in Asia: high-handed, out-of-touch governments; election-proof pseudo-technocracies that act as unaccountable oligarchies; shallow, clique-ish political parties that provide no meaningful transmission belt of citizen preferences; massive government and business corruption; wasteful white-elephant spending to capture global “prestige” while everyday services like health care and education are underfunded; closed political opportunity structures that regularly reward insiders and large corporations with crony connections to the state; wealthy, de-linking elites with 1% lifestyles wildly at variance with the rest of the population… That is not just Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, or the EU/Brussels. That is Asia too; there is more than enough sleaze to go around.

There are three problems with Kelly’s arguments, however. First, Kelly made a mistake of lumping all these “youth demonstrations” together. The youth protests that triggered the Arab Spring were different from the “Occupy movement.” Granted, both have a common element of lamenting the lack of opportunities for the youth, but the structural conditions and the immediate causal factors were vastly different. The Arab Spring happened in authoritarian countries with a clear demand to overthrow the authoritarian rulers, triggered by the self-immolation of a Tunisian youth.

On the other hand, except in democratic countries, the Occupy movement never really took hold, never have a clear agenda aside of “soaking the rich” and “down with evil corporations,” and therefore hasn’t had much of a long-term political impact. Even in the United States, I would argue that Occupy’s importance has been widely exaggerated by its media supporters and its supporters’ massive use of social media. In fact, for countries where protests are common occurrences, such as Indonesia, few really take the Occupy movement seriously. Worldwide media coverage on the Occupy movement was minimal, used mostly to show that even the United States was experiencing protests–basically, to bring the United States down a notch.

Second, I doubt that there’s an epidemic of political demonstrations, where one country could catch and infect other countries with the “mass protest” disease, unless they share a common region or political characteristic, such as in Europe in 1848 or the recent Arab Spring. Even in a so-called “cascade,” as Kelly termed it, there are so many variables in play that countries such as Bahrain might be engulfed in protests but the giant next door, Saudi Arabia, can remain virtually unaffected. In fact, it is very doubtful that the protesters in Egypt looked at Turkey or Brazil as their inspiration.

Most likely, the reason is just very mundane, that it is just a simple coincidence that these three protests occurred at almost the same time. Sure, this explanation may be seen as a cop-out, but then again, there is just no evidence to support the assertion that these three protests were linked with each other.

Third, and most importantly, the problem with Kelly’s “broad structural conditions” that I quoted above above is that that these conditions are actually so widespread that in almost every Asian country– and even in African and South American countries–such political-economic hanky-panky is seen as common or almost a given fact.

I think there are important questions to be asked, such as: where are the demonstrating youths? Why don’t protests happen more often? Why we don’t see more of then on the streets of Seoul, Jakarta, Beijing, Bangkok, and other places?

You want us to protest in this kind of smog?!!

There are several missing variables here that could help to explain the differences between Asia and Turkey, Egypt, and Brazil.

One issue is youth unemployment. The countries where the youths have been protesting have a relatively high youth unemployment rate. Brazil, for instance has almost 20% unemployment rate among its youth. Turkey has a 16.60% unemployment rate. In general, Asia tells a different story, with better employment rates. Basically, for many employed youths in Asian countries, their jobs are more important than going to the street. South Korea, for instance, only has 7.5% youth unemployment rate.

Still, there are some countries with high unemployment rates, such as Indonesia at 19.6% and the Philippines at 16% in 2012. The difference, however, is that in those countries, the numbers are actually improving, and these countries also have burgeoning informal sector economy, which, to some degree, has perversely helped lower their propensity to protest. You can’t protest when you are busy working!

Joko Widodo (Center). The next President of Indonesia?

Moreover, to further tamp down the desire to protest, currently in Indonesia, the Governor of Jakarta Joko Widodo is the most popular politician in Indonesia and a favorite to win next year’s election. He is well regarded as an able reformer with soft heart for the poor. President Benigno Aquino III is widely popular in the Philippines. The positive outlook of these countries actually helped tamp down the desire to go on the street.

Second, there is no trigger issue that could make everyone coming together, kinda… like this:

In Turkey, the trigger was the Gezi Park. In Brazil, it was the increase in transportation fares. And in Egypt, it was the first anniversary of Morsi’s presidency. Of course, it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to confidently declare what kind of trigger will spark massive protests. More likely is the case that these triggers will vary from case to case.

For instance, Indonesia, which shares the same structural conditions as Kelly noted, did not erupt in protests when the government cut subsidies and raise fuel price a while ago. Rather, the atmosphere here in Indonesia was more of resignation, that the fuel price increases were coming anyway, like it or not. True, there were some protests with university students clashing with the police. But the scale and scope of the protests was nowhere as close to what happened in Gezi, let alone Tahrir Square.

Third, in most cases, government overreactions precipitated much bigger protests, even though the protesters themselves, by and large, were peaceful and non-destructive. In Turkey, police overreactions coupled with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s infamous remark of calling the protesters “capulcu” (looters), triggered a much bigger demonstration. In Brazil, the police’s use of rubber bullets on both protesters and journalists indiscriminately caused a much bigger protest a few days later. Meantime, in Egypt, it was more of Morsi’s authoritarian inclinations, his threats of violence, not to mention various missteps, that made theplanned demonstration turnout to be much bigger than expected.

In Indonesia, the anti-fuel price increase protesters behaved violently and causedmassive traffic jams, which in the end alienated the public, whose support they needed.

We are blockading the streets, inconveniencing millions for your sake. Therefore you should support us!

Therefore, back to the main question: Can we predict where or when the next massive demonstration might happen? Here is my answer: check the youth employment and see whether the government overreacts. That is probably a very fuzzy and unsatisfying answer, but that’s the best answer I can give.

My second article at Medium, “This War Game is a Warning to China“, is now up. Have at it.

Apologies for the late posting, I was on vacation in the Midwest.

My first article at Medium is out, on Japan’s recent history of naval aviation and future prospects for aircraft carriers. You’ll find it here.

A few days ago political scientist and Eurasia Group president Ian Bremmer made an astute point on Twitter:

“Hillary/Donilon/Geither to Kerry/Rice/Lew. Lots, lots less Asia focus in 2nd term Obama team. Let’s hope Xi Jinping doesn’t notice.”

I think Bremmer’s assessment is spot on. Practically all of the most important people who have worked to implement the economic, diplomatic, military-security, and political components of the so-called Pivot to Asia have left the Obama administration. Even (former Defense Secretary) Leon Panetta, who did significant work on the pivot, is gone.

And it’s not as if the outgoing personnel are being replaced with a new cast of Asia hands. John Kerry, Susan Rice, Samatha Power, and so on, are most comfortable working on transnational relations, ethno-religious conflicts, genocide, failed states, Africa, and the Middle East. All of these issues are important, to be sure, so is peace and stability in Asia. At this point, it seems the Pivot has quickly become a thing of the past.

Of course, we can debate whether the Pivot was the right set of policies to cope with a rising, confident Asia, a region with much promise and potential pitfalls. I have questioned the Pivot’s emphasis on military and security affairs in Asia, believing it risked appearing too provocative to China. That said, if the Pivot wasn’t working, if it wasn’t achieving it’s designed goals, that’s not a good reason for America to scrap completely its focus on Asia. Create and execute a different Asia policy. But, alas, apparently that’s not the case.

Just look at what John Kerry has spent most of his time on in his new position: the Middle East. He made a quick three-day visit to Japan, China, and South Korea in mid-April, a trip that was narrowly focused on crisis diplomacy involving North Korea. On the other hand, Kerry has already made four trips to the Middle East, as he tries to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace initiatives and resolve the ongoing violence in Syria. In fact, those four visits don’t include his travels to Russia and Belgium, where he continued his diplomatic maneuvering on Syria.

I fear this is what foreign policy will look like for the rest of Obama’s term in office. Team Obama will fixate, as has been the case in American foreign policy, on Middle Eastern politics. Asia will surface from time to time, only when a crisis emerges or when the US coordinates a visit with Asian political leaders, like today’s trip to California by Xi Jinping. This is unfortunate.

By again obsessing about the Middle East and downplaying the importance of Asia, the U.S. will, in effect, cede ground to China in the competition for power and influence, especially in Asia. As a result, China can breathe a sigh of relief. Team Obama has probably just relaxed the noose of containment. America’s allies, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, etc., should be very concerned about their status and position in the region. And once again, the U.S. is likely left wanting for a set policies that can protect its interests in Asia.

Originally posted here at Center for World Conflict and Peace.

JASDF F-15J air superiority fighters. Creative Commons photo, Flickr user Delta16v.

For more than forty years, as part of an alliance with the United States, Japan was allowed access to some of the very best fighters in the world. A string of American fighters, starting with the F-86 Sabre, then the F-104 Starfighter, F-4 Phantom and finally the F-15 provided the mainstay of the Air Self Defense Forces. Offering Japan first-rate fighters only nine years after World War II may sound odd, but America was convinced that postwar Japan was a vital strategic ally. The doors of the Arsenal of Democracy swung open wide and Japan (and America) benefitted enormously.

Of course, Japan didn’t realize that, forty years later, those doors would close a little bit and the F-15 would be the final first rank fighter it would have access to. In 1998, the so-called “Obey Amendment” to the U.S. defense budget prohibited the U.S. from exporting the F-22 Raptor abroad. Although practically nobody comes out and says it, the Obey Amendment is likely the result of transfers of U.S. technology from Israel to the People’s Republic of China, which resulted in aircraft such as the J-10. Realistically the likelihood of an arms transfer ban specifically targeting Israel is exactly zero, and as a result the F-22 was banned from export to any country, no matter how loyal to the United States.

Separated at birth? IAI Lavi and J-10 fighters, comparison.

Since the passage of the act the official line has been that the F-35 is the American fighter reserved for Japan. Various efforts, some led by members of Congress have tried to overturn the F-22 ban, but those have run into the reality that nobody could promise that F-22 technology would ever be leaked again…especially by a certain country. So the F-22 remained the sole ward of the United States Air Force, and when the production line ended, the tooling was put into storage in the unlikely event the aircraft would be resurrected.

Now, imagine you’re Japan. You’ve enjoyed cozy relationship with the American Military-Industrial Complex for decades, getting the very best fighters, and even the right to produce those fighters, under license, in Japan. You’ve held up your end of the bargain, and you expect the relationship to continue. You limit your own fighter production program to licensed builds, not bothering to develop indigenous designs. Why should you?

Along comes the Obey Amendment…and you’re screwed. You have an aging fleet of F-4EJ Phantom fighters you expected to replace with F-22s, and that’s not going to happen. America instead offers you the F-35 Lightning II, a multi-role fighter over budget, behind schedule, and worst of all, it doesn’t suit your requirements. You wanted a two engine air superiority fighter ? You can’t have it. Why? Because you can’t be trusted with the technology. Why now? Because we said so.

Do you know anyone excited about this plane? Neither do I.

If you were Japan, would that not make you more than a little uneasy about your access to future weapons systems? Especially with China breathing down your neck?

The answer is yes, that is making Japan very  uneasy. And it is taking steps. Consider this article that came out just today.

Japan, France to start talks to jointly develop military equipment

SINGAPORE–Despite Japanese objections to France’s military equipment sales to China and Russia, Japan has agreed to hold official talks on joint weapons development with France.

Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera on June 2 met with his French counterpart on the sidelines of the Asia Security Summit here. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian showed a strong interest in Japanese weapons-related technology, and proposed that the two nations jointly develop military weapons and equipment.

Onodera and Le Drian agreed that Japan and France will begin talks aimed at hammering out an agreement to carry out joint arms development, beginning with the bilateral summit scheduled for June 7 in Tokyo.

“I think there is no difference with France in our thinking on this,” Onodera told reporters after the meeting with Le Drian, showing his support for joint arms development efforts.

(Asahi Shimbun, June 3rd, 2013. Link)

A little more than a year ago, Japan signed a similar deal with the U.K.

Japan, U.K. agree on arms development

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and British leader David Cameron agreed Tuesday in Tokyo to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation, including joint weapons development, in what will be the first such case since Japan eased its de facto ban on arms exports.

by ROBERTO TOFANI

Vietnamese Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, will deliver the keynote address at the 12th IISS Asia Security Summit(1), also called the Shangri-La Dialogue, which will convene in Singapore from 31 May to Jun 2.

The meeting is “a Track One security summit which brings together defense ministers, armed forces’ commanders, and the most senior defense officials, together with distinguished non-governmental experts from universities, think-tanks, the media and the private sector from all states with significant stakes in the security of the Asia-Pacific to engage in high-level international defense diplomacy on key regional security concerns,” according to the IISS website.

The Shangri-La Dialogue is widely recognised as the main inter-governmental regional security summit. Moreover, over the years “it has become an essential part of the institutional framework for Asia-Pacific security,” it is specified.

“We are delighted that Prime Minster Nguyen Tan Dung will be speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue. His participation and the perspective of Vietnam on current defense issues and conflict resolution opportunities will add significant weight to the crucial discussions about regional security which will take place there,” Dr. John Chipman, Director-General and CEO of the IISS, said.

The Socialist Republic is often described as an Asian tiger, a developing country that has been able to achieve positive results, especially in poverty reduction, economic growth and in an increase in literacy rates. Furthermore, together with other nine members (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), Vietnam shares the common vision of an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) community, the base for a stronger regionalism.

Vietnam is increasingly an active member of the Association and a strategic regional player. For these reasons, and especially after a year during which the maritime disputes in the South China Sea have been assuming a dangerous profile, there are high expectations from Dung’s keynote address.

In 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue was opened by the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose government has been acting as mediator especially at a regional level between China and ASEAN claimants in the dispute (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam). Among other security issues, Yudhoyono strongly underlined the dispute in the South China Sea, which more and more has implications both on a regional and international level. “We can accept that the overlapping territorial and jurisdictional claims are still a long way from being resolved. However– the Indonesian president said–even without waiting for a resolution over territorial disputes, we can still find ways to transform the potential conflicts in the South China Sea into potential cooperation. We need to pick up speed. It took ten years for the Guidelines of the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea to be completed. It should not take another ten years for the ASEAN-China Working Group to complete the Code of Conduct; we expect them to move on speedily with their task.”

But this year, despite the fact that the South China Sea issue is a flashpoint, it is not on the formal agenda of the three-day summit and none of the five plenary sessions will focus on that or on the protection of the maritime freedom as happened in 2012.

During the upcoming Shangri-La Dialogue, the five plenary sessions will focus on: the ‘US approach to regional security’; ‘Defending National interests (Preventing conflict)’; ‘Military Modernisation and Strategic Transparency’; ‘New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security’ and ‘Advancing Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific’.

The South China Sea issue “is likely to be raised when it is of relevance to regional security issues discussed in plenary session. It is up to Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in the opening keynote dinner address to raise the South China Sea issue and to present not only Vietnam’s view but practical suggestions for the way ahead,” Carlyle A. Thayer of the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra (Australia) stated in a recent briefing paper. This means that if the Prime Minister sidesteps the South China Sea issue, discussions are likely to turn to other security issues.

Recently, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Li agreed to start again talks with ASEAN on the legally binding Code of Conduct (COC) and setting up an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to complement government-to-government talks. The announcement came after a South East Asian tour during which Vietnam and the Philippines were omitted by the Chinese Foreign Minister. “Minister Wang is obviously trying to detect differences within ASEAN and to exert subtle pressure to isolate the Philippines, if not Vietnam,” explained Prof. Thayer.

For many observers, the maritime dispute in what the Vietnamese call the East Sea, involving four countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan), is exacerbating the relationships between Beijing and Hanoi, thus risking to undermine the stability in the region. On May 15, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested against China’s unilateral implementation of a ban on fishing in the South China Sea. “China’s unilateral implementation of the ban on fishing in the East Sea in 2013, which encompasses some portions of Vietnam’s waters, violates Vietnam’s sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Luong Thanh Nghi said.

This announcement was made during the four-day visit by the Vietnamese Prime Minister to Russia, where he also inspected the testing progress of a Kilo-class submarine, which Vietnam has contracted to buy from Moscow. This is seen as a step in the effort to counterbalance China’s expanding maritime influence in the region.

The security summit thus comes at a significant moment, when the two parties have the opportunity to dialogue on the possibility of finalizing an agenda on which path to follow over the next several months. With his keynote address, which he will make in the presence of, among others, newly appointed US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Dung has a crucial opportunity to clarify Vietnam’s position and goals regarding the South China Sea issue.

Notes

1 – The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) was founded in the UK in 1958 with a focus on nuclear deterrence and arms control. Today, it is also renowned for its annual Military Balance assessment of countries’ armed forces and for its high-powered security summits, including the Shangri-La Dialogue.

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Roberto Tofani is a freelance journalist and analyst covering South East Asia. He is also the co-founder of PlanetNext, an association of journalists committed to the concept of “information for change” and editor of Sudestasiatico.com. 

On May 11, Taipei issued a 72-hour ultimatum which expired at midnight on May 14. The government demanded that four conditions be met otherwise it would introduce sanctions, including those that would affect Filipino workers seeking employment in Taiwan. When the ultimatum was issued, there was already significant pressure on the government from legislators, public opinion, and both major parties. Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers denouncing shooting as an act of war and a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator burning the Philippines national flag during a protest in front of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO, the Philippines unofficial embassy in Taipei) are just some of the more jingoist attitudes on view recently in Taiwan.

This does not mean that the government should disregard the public outrage in Taiwan over PCG’s conduct. Whatever happened on 9 May in Balintang Channel, a 15-ton fishing boat with a 4-men crew does not seem to represent a threat that would justify the intensive fire that hit the boat 40-50 times according to various reports. Indeed, the investigators from the Phillipnes are contemplating that the PCG might have violated rules of engagement. Furthermore, use of force against unarmed vessels is problematic under international law. Ultimately, the video recording that was allegedly made by the PCG vessel crew may confirm Manila’s version, but since it has not been released yet, speculation mounts and the damage has been already done.

Taipei’s ultimatum has passed and a delayed apology eventually came. However, it was then rejected as insincere and the Taiwanese government’s sanctions came into effect. In two waves, the Ma Yingjeou government introduced 11 measures that include the suspension of hiring Filipino workers, a travel warning discouraging Taiwanese to travel to the Philippines, and the announcement of forthcoming military exercises in the disputed area. The DPP opposition added further oil to the fire by demanding even harsher actions. Other retaliatory measures included Taipei City Government’s retraction of an invitation to the Philippines team to compete in the dragon boat festival race and the suspension of exchanges with sister cities in the Philippines.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not show any diplomatic subtlety when it displayed pictures on its homepage in both Chinese and English bluntly accusing the Philippines of cold-blooded murder. The Philippines’ response, has not been flawless either. If the government wanted to defuse tensions, explaining absence of a formal apology by its adherence to “One China” principle, meaning that Taiwan as Republic of China is not recognized by the Philippines and thus does not deserve formal apology, is not the best way to achieve that.

Screenshot of ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs homepage (Accessed on 20 May 2013)

The actions of the Ma Ying-jeou administration, the KMT and the DPP, can all be interpreted as courting  popular support. President Ma, with his 14 percent low approval rating, seized the chance to divert attention from criticism regarding his government’s handling of the economy, disregarding Taiwan’s international image in the process for the sake of domestic political posturing. This is not unusual in Taiwan’s politics, where foreign policy issues are usually not the most prominent ones for the electorate or politicians. The DPP for its part wants to take some credit for acting tough, partly compelled by the fact that the victim’s community was based in the Pingtung, an area with strong support for the DPP. In short, both sides of Taiwan’s political sphere can be blamed for heating up tensions that started with a tragic death.

There is a darker side to the story. Many western visitors and expatriates frequently attest  to the kindness and hospitality of Taiwanese towards foreigners; something that Taiwanese themselves take great pride in saying. Yet, this courtesy appears more likely to be extended to westerners. Racist or xenophobic attitudes towards workers from Southeast Asian countries are common and the current crisis has unleashed numerous examples of this behaviour. Foreign workers are reported as being requested to reveal their nationality in markets or shops and are refused service if they are from the Philippines. Taipei Times quoted a worker from Cambodia as saying, “I’ve not been attacked, because I’m from Cambodia, but I don’t feel comfortable when people keep asking me whether I’m from the Philippines when I’m just going to buy lunch.” On 16 May, a Filipino worker was attacked by four men and beaten with iron sticks and baseball bats in Tainan. Although it appears to be isolated incident, reports about verbal harassment are more frequent. And those attitudes may be well reflected at the political level. Philip Bowring argues in his piece published in the South China Morning Post that Taiwan’s reaction is driven by Han chauvinism and adds (referring to Taipei’s displeasure with an unofficial apology) that “[For] the Han chauvinists, an apology from the president of the Philippines is not enough. The Filipinos must grovel, be reminded that they, like Malays generally, are the serfs of the region.”

Political posturing is one thing, picking on isolated vulnerable individuals just because they are from a country in dispute with their host is another. Yet, they are not disconnected. Taiwanese politicians and media that jumped on the boat of nationalist rhetoric, should understand that flexing their muscles externally may result in xenophobic actions at home. Fortunately, politicians from both sides, including President Ma and Taipei Mayor Hau, were quick to urge the public not to vent anger against the 87,154 Philippines nationals that reside in Taiwan along with almost 200,000 Indonesians, 100,000 Vietnamese and over 60,000 Thais according to official sources.

This article was originally written for China Policy Institute and posted on author’s personal blog Taiwan in Perspective.